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CRIMINAL LAW
LIMITING LEON: A MISTAKE OF LAW
ANALOGY
ROBERT L. MISNER*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The debate on the advisability of creating a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule smoldered for years in the dissenting
and concurring opinions of the Supreme Court,1 only to reach full
flame in the pages of criminal procedure commentaries 2 just prior
to the Supreme Court's decision in Illinois v. Gates.3 Although the
promise of a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not
reach fruition in Gates,4 advocates of such an exception merely had
to wait an additional term of court before their wishes came true.
The Court's decisions in United States v. Leon 5 and Massachusetts v.
Sheppard6 created an exception to the exclusionary rule and held
that illegally seized evidence could be used in the prosecution's case
if police officers seized the evidence "in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant." '7 Cases decided
after Leon have begun to establish certain patterns and it appears
that some of the worst fears of the dissenting Justices in Leon are
coming true.8 Commentators on Leon and Sheppard have brought to
* Dean, Willamette University College of Law. J.D., University of Chicago, 1971;
A.B., University of San Francisco, 1968. The author acknowledges the assistance of Kel-

ley Buntjer, Arizona State University College of Law, Class of 1988, and the support of
Streich, Lang, Weeks & Cardon of Phoenix, Arizona.
1 See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 n.ll (1984)(citing cases).
2 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.2, at 3-4 (Supp. 1986)(citing several
articles).
3 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
4 Id.
5 468 U.S. 897 (1984).

6 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
7 Leon, 468 U.S. at 922.
8 See, e.g., infra note 57.
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the surface many of the practical and theoretical difficulties in Leon. 9
Some commentators have concluded that both Leon and Sheppard
make sense only if viewed as part of a process that will eventually
overrule Mapp v. Ohio.10 Curiously enough, an argument missing
from the debate over the good faith exception is the analogy of that
exception to the substantive criminal law's mistake of law defense.
This missing argument has caused the debate to lose both a sense of
history and a sense of consistency within the criminal law. Opponents of a good faith exception have failed to capitalize on the historic common law view that a mistake of law by a police officer or
anyone else does not excuse the conduct."' Proponents of the good
faith exception have failed to take Leon's good faith exception and
analogize it to the Model Penal Code's limited mistake of law defense which excuses an act which was done pursuant to a court
12
order.
Ironically, the analogy of the good faith exception to a limited
mistake of law defense permits reasonable limitations to be placed
upon Leon 13 while at the same time acknowledging that Leon is perhaps fatally flawed. 14 The analogy dictates that Leon not be extended to warrantless searches.' 5 In addition, such an analogy,
while bringing some degree of symmetry to the substantive and procedural criminal law, also provides a way to reconcile such cases as
Michigan v. De FillippoW with the mainstream of fourth amendment
case law. Finally, the analogy confronts directly a problem too long
ignored: to what extent are decisions by magistrates "real" court
decisions? 17 For example, was Shadwick v. City of Tampa,' 8 which up9 See, e.g., W. LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 10-36; Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE LJ.

906 (1986).
10 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See, e.g., Duke, Making Leon Worse, 95 YALE LJ. 1405, 1422
(1986); LaFave, "The Seductive Call of Expediency:" United States v. Leon, Its Rationale and
Ramifications, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 895, 930; Wasserstrom & Mertens, The Exclusionary
Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It a Fair Trial, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 85-93 (1984).
11 See infra text accompanying notes 69-104.
12 See infra text accompanying notes 114-23. Even before Leon was decided, Professor Kamisar warned that a good faith exception may only be a battle in the "war of
attrition" against the exclusionary rule. Kamisar, Gates, "ProbableCause,"-"Good Faith,"
and Beyond, 69 IowA L. REV. 551, 614 (1984).
13 See infra text accompanying notes 163-265.
14 See infra text accompanying notes 139-62.
15 Many authors have expressed fear that Leon may be merely a step toward expanding the good faith exception to warrantless cases. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE, supra note 2,
at 33-34; Bradley, The "Good Faith Exception" Cases: Reasonable Exercises in Futility, 60 IND.
L.J. 287, 298-99 (1985).
16 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
17 See infra text accompanying notes 201-24.
18 407 U.S. 345 (1972).
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held the constitutionality of the issuance of arrest warrants by nonlawyer court clerks, wrongly decided in light of Leon and the unreviewability of constitutional decisions which Leon seems to
authorize?
II.

LEON AND THE ANALOGY TO MISTAKE OF LAW

A major purpose of the substantive criminal law is to induce
external conformity to rules. The purpose of the law is to force
compliance with a set of norms. 19 The criminal law achieves this
standard setting function mainly through notions of retribution and
20
deterrence.
The refusal to allow generally a mistake of law defense is seen
as necessary so that the parameters of rights will be learned and
respected. 2 ' Even if the transgressor is unaware of the illegality or
immorality of his act, and consequently is incapable of being specifically deterred from his act by the threat of punishment, the person
must be punished so that the proper standard of conduct will be
learned and respected by others.2 2 The criminal law has generally
refused to elevate specific deterrence of the individual above its goal
of general deterrence and general education 23 and therefore has, in
24
the main, rejected the notion that mistake of law excuses conduct.
The exclusionary rule is intended to serve a similar, standardsetting function. In Leon, 2 5 and in cases preceding Leon, 2 6 the
Supreme Court held that the sole function of the exclusionary rule
is to deter illegal police conduct and thereby " 'safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather
than a personal constitutional right of the person aggrieved.' "27
Consequently, an analysis of Leon in light of the criminal law's treat19 See Hall, Ignorance and Mistake in CriminalLaw, 33 IND. LJ. 1, 21 (1957).
20 See, e.g., Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusionor Reality?, 43J. GRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 176, 179 80 (1952).
21 Hall, supra note 19, at 18-23.
22

J.

HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW

382-83 (2d ed. 1960).

23 SeeJ. SMITH & B. HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 54-55 (3d ed. 1973).

24 One must be careful to distinguish those situations in which knowledge of the law
is an element of the offense. When knowledge is an element, a conviction can only be
sustained if the prosecution has proved it. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTr, CRIMINAL LAW

357-60 (1972).
25 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
26 For a discussion of the development of the justification for the exclusionary rule
away from the concept ofjudicial integrity, see W. LAFAvE, supra note 2, § 1.1, at 17-20

(1978).
27 Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348
(1974)).
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ment of mistake of law should give some insight into the way in
which Leon may be applied and limited.
The analogy of the doctrine of ignorance or mistake of law to
the good faith exception developed in Leon is not complete, however, because punishment for a violation of a criminal statute is
most often addressed directly to the actor and punishment is only
rarely imposed in a vicarious fashion. The "punishment" associated
with the exclusionary rule is directed against the state and the state
is "punished" for the actions of its agent. Only in an incidental way
28
can it be said that the officer is personally punished.
III.

THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION IN LEON

In its 1984 Term, the Supreme Court delivered opinions in two
companion cases which created a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The decisions, which eschewed traditional constitutional decision making technique, 2 9 may be intended as harbingers
0
of the ultimate demise of the exclusionary rule in its entirety.3
In United States v. Leon, 3 1 a facially valid search warrant was issued by a state superior court judge. Large quantities of drugs were
found in a number of separate locations and seized pursuant to the
warrant. 3 2 The evidence was suppressed in "a close case" by the
federal district court 33 and the suppression was upheld by a divided
28 Traditionally the criminal law has been somewhat loath to impose criminal sanctions against corporations or corporate executives for actions by employees. The tide
has seemed to turn in favor of such criminal accountability. See, e.g., Sentencing Commission
Ponders How to Punish Organizations, 39 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2243-44 (June 25, 1986).
29 It is probable, though admittedly not certain, that the Court of Appeals would
now conclude that the warrant in Leon satisfied the Fourth Amendment if it were
given the opportunity to reconsider the issue in the light of Gates. Adherence to our
normal practice following the announcement of a new rule would therefore postpone, and probably obviate, the need for the promulgation of the broad new rule
the Court announces today.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 961-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
30 Ten years ago in United States v. Calandra,I expressed [in dissent] the fear that
the Court's decision "may signal that a majority of my colleagues have positioned
themselves to reopen the door [to evidence secured by official lawlessness] still further and abandon altogether the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases."
Since then, in case after case, I have witnessed the Court's gradual but determined
strangulation of the rule. It now appears that the Court's victory over the Fourth
Amendment is complete. That today's decision represents the pice de risistance of
the Court's past efforts cannot be doubted, for today the Court sanctions the use in
the prosecution's case in chief of illegally obtained evidence against the individual
whose rights have been violated a result that had previously been thought to be
foreclosed.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 928-29 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(footnote and citations omitted).
31 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
32 Id. at 901-02.
33 Id. at 903.
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panel of the Ninth Circuit.3 4 After the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
lower court's decision, but before the case was heard in the
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court decided Illinois v. Gates,3 5 which
spared probable cause determinations from the more rigorous analysis required by the Court under Aguilar v. Texas3 6 and Spinelli v.
United States and adopted a "totality of circumstances" test.3 7 The
Supreme Court acknowledged that it was within its power to consider Leon under the new "totality of circumstances" test3 8 and
therefore avoid the good faith issue.3 9 The Supreme Court, however, jumped at the opportunity to create a new good faith exception. The Court in Leon held that the "exclusionary rule should be
modified so as not to bar the use in the prosecution's case in chief of
evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a
search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause." 40 Suppression
remains an appropriate remedy if (1) the magistrate was misled by
the affidavit either intentionally or recklessly; 4 1 (2) the magistrate in
issuing the warrant "wholly abandon[s] his judicial role"; 4 2 (3) no
34

United States v. Leon, 701 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).

35
36
37

462 U.S. 213 (1983).
378 U.S. 108 (1964).
393 U.S. 410 (1969).

38 Leon, 468 U.S. at 905.
39 Id.

Id. at 900.
Id. at 923. This exception to the Leon standard was first recognized in Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). In Franks, the Court held that
where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement
knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included
by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary
to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be
held at the defendant's request.
Id. at 155-56. Thus, if the false statements are excluded and the remaining information
is insufficient to establish probable cause, the good faith exception is inapplicable, and
the fruits of the search must be suppressed. Id. at 156.
This exception has been invoked in several cases, including United States v.
Reivich, 610 F. Supp. 538 (W.D. Mo. 1985), rev'd, 793 F.2d 957 (8th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Boyce, 601 F. Supp. 947 (D. Minn. 1985); Stewart v. State, 289 Ark. 272, 711
S.W.2d 787 (1986); State v. Horton, 207 NJ. Super. 555, 504 A.2d 801 (1985).
In Reivich, the district court first determined that the affidavit lacked probable cause
for the issuance of the search warrant. The court refused to apply Leon because the
officers failed to include information in the affidavit regarding inducements given certain
witnesses for their information. "[Detective] Sweeten displayed, at the very least, reckless disregard for the truth of said affidavit." 610 F. Supp. at 545.
42 Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984). The Court cites Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S.
319 (1979), as an illustration of intolerable judicial conduct. In Lo-Ji Sales, an investigator presented two reels of"obscene" film from defendant's adult bookstore to the Town
Justice in order to procure a search warrant. The Town Justice agreed that the film was
"obscene" and issued the search warrant. Id. at 321.
The TownJustice, however, personally accompanied the officers to the bookstore to
40
41
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reasonably trained officer would rely on the warrant;4 3 or (4) the
warrant is "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render offi' 44
cial belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.
In order to understand the good faith exception and the four
exceptions to the exception, it is necessary to understand the
Supreme Court's view of the deterrent effect of the exclusionary
rule. Justice White, writing for the majority, debunked the notion
that the exclusionary rule is "a necessary corollary of the Fourth
Amendment" 4 5 and concluded that "[t]he rule thus operates as 'a
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment
perform an ad hoc, piece-by-piece obscenity determination. Id. at 322-23. Each item
deemed obscene was amended into the existing search warrant. Id. at 324. In suppressing the evidence, the Court stated that the Town Justice's actions
did not manifest the neutrality and detachment demanded of ajudicial officer when
presented with a warrant application.... He allowed himself to become a member,
if not the leader, of the search party which was essentially a police operation....
[Hie was not acting as a judicial officer but as an adjunct law enforcement officer.
Id. at 326-27. See, e.g., Stewart v. State, 289 Ark. 272, 711 S.W.2d 787 (1986)(good faith
rule not applicable when judge signed pad of 50 blank arrest warrants and authorized
his clerk to issue the warrants on her own after reading the affidavit); United States v.
Freitas, 610 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1985); United States v. Guarino, 610 F. Supp. 371
(D.R.I. 1984); Jauregui v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1160, 225 Cal. Rptr. 308
(1986).
43 Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984). See, e.g., Rand v. State, 484 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1986)(affidavit insufficient because it failed to allege specifically when drugs
were observed on defendant's premises; good faith exception inapplicable because deputy executing warrant knew it was facially deficient, therefore any reliance was unreasonable); United States v. Hale, 784 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 110 (1986);
United States v. Washington, 782 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Crozier, 777
F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Mayer, 620 F. Supp. 249 (D. Utah 1985);
United States v. Burke, 613 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ga. 1985), rev'd, 784 F.2d 1090 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 2901 (1986);Jauregui v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d
1160, 225 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1986); Howard v. State, 483 So. 2d 844 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986); Sims v. State, 483 So. 2d 81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Ross, 471 So. 2d
196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 312 (1985); Collins v. State, 465 So. 2d
1266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Robinson, 371 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985); State v. Connard, 81 N.C. App. 327, 344 S.E.2d 568 (1986); State v. Thompson,
369 N.W.2d 363 (N.D. 1985); Miller v. State, 703 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
44 Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. See, e.g., Ex Parte State, 476 So. 2d 632, 634 (Ala. 1985)(affidavit, which "consist[ed] solely of the affiant's conclusion that the named individual
committed an offense, without setting forth the facts upon which the conclusion is
based, [is] fatally defective"; officer's reliance on arrest warrant was thus unreasonable;
good faith exception inapplicable); United States v. Granger, 596 F. Supp. 665 (W.D.
Wis. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1232 (1986); Herrington v. State, 287 Ark. 228, 697
S.W.2d 899 (1985); Vasquez v. State, 491 So. 2d 297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Stabenow v. State, 495 N.E.2d 197 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); Blalock v. State, 476 N.E.2d 901
(Ind. Ct. App.), vacated, 483 N.E.2d 439 (Ind. 1985); State v. Saddler, 490 So. 2d 1155
(La. Ct. App. 1986); Adkins v. State, 675 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); State v.
Adkins, 346 S.E.2d 762 (W. Va. 1986); State v. Brady, 130 Wis. 2d 443, 388 N.W.2d 151
(1986).
45 Leon, 468 U.S. at 905-06.
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rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal
constitutional right of the person aggrieved.' "46 The Court seems
unsure of the type of deterrence it is seeking. On the one hand, the
Court stated that the exclusionary rule "must alter the behavior of
individual law enforcement officers or the policies of the departments." '4 7 Yet, on the other hand, the Court noted that "[w]e have
frequently questioned whether the exclusionary rule can have any
deterrent effect when the offending officers acted in the objectively
reasonable belief that their conduct did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. '48 The Court's initial statements justify the decision
in Leon under a rather curious form of general deterrence, and the
Court seems not quite sure whether deterrence should center on the
individual officer, the officer's department or police officers generally. 4 9 The Court concludes in Leon that when "an officer acting
with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from ajudge
or magistrate and acted within its scope[,]. .

.

. [i]n most such

cases[] there is no police illegality and thus nothing to deter." 50
One might ask why there is no police illegality if it is determined later that there was no probable cause to search. Has not a
person's constitutional right been violated? Why is this not "police
illegality"? In a very subtle sleight of hand the Supreme Court narrows the purpose of the exclusionary rule. The deterrent effect of
the exclusionary rule is now directed to "police misconduct rather
than to punish the errors ofjudges and magistrates." 5 1 Although an
"illegality" occurs when the police search without a valid warrant, it
is not police illegality, and therefore it is not illegality which is to be
deterred by the exclusionary rule. A police officer's task is not to
second- guess the magistrate. It is the magistrate's responsibility to
issue search warrants. " 'Once the warrant issues, there is literally
nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to comply with the
47
48

Id. at 906 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
Id. at 918.
Id.

49
50

See Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 10, at 117-22.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 920-21.

46

51 Id. at 916. See Alschuler, "Close Enoughfor Government Work:" The Exclusionary Rule
after Leon, 1984 Sup. CT. REv. 309, 351-57; LaFave, supra note 10, at 906-09; Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 10, 105-12. See also Sadie v. State, 488 So. 2d 1368, 1378
(Ala. Crim. App. 1986)("overbroad search was due to the investigators' failure to obtain
and provide the most detailed information possible about the premises for which they
were requesting a warrant.... Where the error does not fall on the issuing magistrate,
but rather on the officers, the exception does not apply"; the exclusionary rule acts to
deter this type of police misconduct). See also United States v. Mount, 757 F.2d 1315
(D.C. Cir. 1985); State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 716 P.2d 1288 (1986); People v.
Joseph, 128 Ill. App. 3d 668, 470 N.E.2d 1303 (1984); State v. Varvil, 686 S.W.2d 507
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
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law....' Penalizing the officer for the magistrate's error, rather than
his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth
Amendment violations." 5 2 If there is illegality, it is illegality permitted in good faith by the issuing magistrate. But the exclusionary
rule, in the Court's opinion, has little impact upon the decisions of
53
the magistrate.
Without any real support for its conclusion, the Court simply
removes the exclusionary rule as a mechanism to prompt the magistrate to enforce fourth amendment rights. 54 The exclusionary rule
no longer is intended to force compliance to the fourth amendment
by all state officials, but is now only effective to deter police officials
from committing fourth amendment violations.
But what is painfully missing from the Court's discussion in
Leon is any real discussion of how the system can insure that the
magistrate will perform his now virtually unreviewable duties. 5 5 In a
footnote, the Court offers its single hope for containing errant magistrates: " 'It may be that a ruling by an appellate court that a search
warrant was unconstitutional would be sufficient to deter similar
misconduct in the future by magistrates.' "56 The Supreme Court
does not deny that illegality has occurred, and in fact, the Supreme
Court calls on appellate courts to review the underlying fourth
amendment issues even though their decision will not impact the
52 Leon, 468 U.S. at 921 (Burger, CJ., concurring) (footnote omitted) (quoting Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 498 (1976)).
53 Judges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team; as neutral
judicial officers, they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions. The threat of exclusion thus cannot be expected significantly to deter them.
Imposition of the exclusionary sanction is not necessary meaningfully to inform judicial officers of their errors, and we cannot conclude that admitting evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant while at the same time declaring that the warrant was
somehow defective will in any way reduce judicial officers' professional incentives to

comply with the Fourth Amendment, encourage them to repeat their mistakes, or
lead to the granting of all colorable warrant requests.
Id. at 917 (footnote omitted). See Alschuler, supra note 51, at 318-22. But see Dripps,
supra note 9, at 916.
54 Leon, 468 U.S. at 916.
55 In a footnote, Justice White indicates that federal magistrates may be removed for
incompetency. Id. at 917 n.18. It is difficult to believe that removal from office will be
an effective way to supervise the issuance of warrants. For discussions of the unreviewability of the magistrate's decision see Bradley, supra note 15, at 292-93; Dripps,
supra note 9, at 907. In fact, one study has concluded that " 'a magistrate who turn[s]
down a significant number of warrant applications would not last long on the bench.'"
Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 10, at 110 n. 188 (quoting R. Van Duizend, L. Sutton
& C. Carter, The Search Warrant Process: Preconceptions, Perceptions and Practices
ch. 7 § 2 (undated & unpublished manuscript)(available through National Center for
State Courts)).
56 Leon, 468 U.S. at 916-17 n.15 (quoting Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass.
488, 506, 441 N.E.2d 725, 735 (1982), rev'd, 468 U.S. 981 (1984)).
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admission of evidence in the cases before them. 57 A person's constitutional right to privacy, therefore, is to be safeguarded by the hope
that an appellate court will review search and seizure cases notwithstanding its awareness that the outcome of the case will be unaffected by its decision. Justice White predicted that courts may
resolve the underlying fourth amendment question before turning
to the issue of good faith if "reviewing courts could decide in particular cases that magistrates under their supervision need to be informed of their errors."5 8 This solution was Justice White's attempt
to answer the argument that a good faith exception will "freeze
Fourth Amendment law in its present state." 59 The case law supports what common sense tells us busy courts will do: appellate
courts will not always decide the good faith issue and often will refuse to issue advisory opinions on the underlying fourth amendment
issue. 6 0 But even ifJustice White were correct, his solution apparently does not preserve the exclusionary remedy in cases in which
the magistrate is unaware of the appellate court's guidance or
chooses not to follow the appellate court's decision.
57 Id. at 925. Many courts have adopted a two step process: (1) Did the affidavit
establish probable cause for the issuance of the warrant? If not, then (2) is Leon applicable? See, e.g., United States v. Hendricks, 743 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1006 (1985); United States v. Steerwell Leisure Corp., 598 F. Supp. 171, 174
(W.D.N.Y. 1984)(Leon does not mean trial courts should neglect making probable cause
determinations).
However, some courts have eliminated the first step, i.e., have refused to make the
probable cause determination and have proceeded straight to the good faith exception.
See United States v. Accardo, 749 F.2d 1477, 1481 (11th Cir. 1985)("The question here
is not the legal validity of the warrant but the reasonableness of the officers' reliance on
it."), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 314 (1985); United States v. Breckenridge, 782 F.2d 1317
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 136 (1986); United States v. Gant, 759 F.2d 484 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 149 (1985); United States v. Fama, 758 F.2d 834 (2d Cir.
1985); State v. Wildes, 468 So. 2d 550 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Ebey, 491 So.
2d 498 (La. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Green, 478 So. 2d 583 (La. Ct. App. 1985). The
Fifth Circuit has adopted the rule that a probable cause determination should be conducted only if the case represents a" 'novel question of law.' " United States v. Maggitt,
778 F.2d 1029, 1033 (5th Cir. 1985)(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 264
(1983)(White,J., concurring)), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2920 (1986).
58 Leon, 468 U.S. at 925.
59 Id. at 924.
60 Some commentators have predicted that appellate courts would be very reluctant
to review search and seizure cases and write advisory opinions. See, e.g., Wasserstrom &
Mertens, supra note 10, at 110-12. See supra note 57. However, appellate courts have
been more willing than might have been expected to review the fourth amendment
question before deciding the issue of the good faith exception. See United States v.
Savoca, 761 F.2d 292 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 153 (1985); United States v. Hendricks, 743 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1006 (1985); United States v.
Barker, 623 F. Supp. 823 (D. Colo. 1985); Toland v. State, 285 Ark. 415, 688 S.W.2d
718, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 311 (1985); State v. Bernie, 472 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); State v. Murphy, 693 S.W.2d 255 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
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The Court permits the application of the good faith exception
in those situations in which the magistrate has not "abandoned his
detached and neutral role." 6 1 Does a magistrate wholly abandon his
judicial role if he is unaware of recent appellate decisions or chooses
to distinguish away a particular court opinion? Even if his failure to
keep current were held to be an abandonment of his judicial role,
under the Supreme Court's view of the purpose of the exclusionary
rule, one has to doubt whether exclusion of evidence is the proper
remedy for the magistrate's error. If the exclusionary rule is truly
effective only to alter police behavior, whether the magistrate has
"wholly abandoned his judicial role" should only be relevant to exclusion if it appears to the police officer (the person to be deterred)
that the magistrate has failed to act "magisterially." In such circumstances, "no reasonably well trained officer should rely on the warrant. '"62 Unless a state uses its own constitution or statutes to
fashion an exclusionary remedy different from that of the United
States Supreme Court, 63 the federal constitutional right requires the
application of the exclusionary rule only if the actions of the magistrate are objectively unreasonable in the eyes of the officer. As the
Court wrote in Sheppard:
[w]hatever an officer may be required to do when he executes a warrant without knowing beforehand what items are to be seized, we refuse to rule that an officer is required to disbelieve a judge who has
just advised him, by word and by action, that the warrant6 4he possesses
authorizes him to conduct the search he has requested.
Again, the oddity of the Court's decision comes to the fore: the
magistrate's decision to issue a warrant guarantees that evidence
seized pursuant to that warrant may be used unless the magistrate's
mistake is so obvious that it would be recognizable by the officer on
the beat. In effect, a magistrate's decision is "reviewable" only by
the officers who sought the warrant! 6 5 As the Court stated in
Sheppard,
An error of constitutional dimensions [sic] may have been committed
Leon, 468 U.S. at 926.
Id. at 923.
Some states have rejected Leon under their state constitution. See State v. Novembrino, 200 N.J. Super. 229, 491 A.2d 37 (1985); People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 488
N.E.2d 451, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1985); State v. Grawien, 123 Wis. 2d 428, 367 N.W.2d
816 (Ct. App. 1985). See also Stringer v. State 491 So. 2d 837 (Miss. 1986)(Robertson,J.,
concurring). Texas also rejected Leon in an arrest warrant situation, basing its rejection
upon a state criminal procedure statute. Polk v. State, 704 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Ct. App.
1986).
64 Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 989-90 (1984)(footnote omitted).
65 This also appears to be the conclusion reached by Professor Alschuler, supra note
51, at 342, and by Professor LaFave, supra note 10, at 917.
61
62
63
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with respect to the issuance of the warrant, but it was the judge, not
the police officers, who made the critical mistake. "IT]he exclusionary
rule was adopted to deter unlawful searches
by police, not to punish
66
the errors of magistrates and judges."

The creation of the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule in Leon and Sheppard must be viewed in the context of the reliance of an officer upon the judicial decision of a magistrate in issuing a search warrant. Although subsequent cases may read Leon
and Sheppard for the broader proposition that a balancing test must
be used in every case 6 7 to weigh the perceived deterrent effect
against the harm to society when relevant information is excluded,
Leon and Sheppard appear to mirror the policy considerations found
in mistake of law cases with which the criminal law has wrestled for
centuries. If Leon and Sheppard are to guide fourth amendment jurisprudence, the mistake of law analogy dictates that at the very least
the good faith exception must be limited to searches incident to
68
warrants.
IV.
A.

MISTAKE OF LAW DEFENSE

GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RATIONALE OF THE COMMON LAW

Few principles in the criminal law are more firmly and consistently espoused than ignorantiajuris,quod quisque tenetur scire, neminem
excusat.69 The common law has applied the principle that ignorance
or mistake of law is no defense in varied situations, including those
in which the actor's asserted lack of knowledge of the law was clearly
out of step with the knowledge of the law in the general community.7 0 The common law has also relied on the principle in situations in which the actor's ignorance was more understandable 7 ' and
has even applied the principle in situations in which the actor could
not have known the law. 72 In some situations ignorance or mistake
of law may negate the statutorily defined mens rea requirement of a
crime.7 3 Even in jurisdictions in which mistake of law is irrelevant to
66 Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 990 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 263
(1983) (White, J., concurring in judgment)).
67 Leon, 468 U.S. at 906-07.
68 See infra text accompanying notes 162-200.
69 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *27. "The rule that 'ignorance of the law will
not excuse' is deep in our law." Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) (citation
omitted). "The principle that ignorance of the law is no defense applies whether the law
be a statute or a duly promulgated and published regulation." United States v. Int'l
Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971).
70 See, e.g., Hall, supra note 19, at 20.
71 See, e.g., R. v. Esop, 7 Car. & P. 456, 173 Eng. Rep. 203 (O.B. 1836).
72 See, e.g., R. v. Bailey, Russ. & Ry. 1, 168 Eng. Rep. 651 (1800).
73 Hall & Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, U. CHI. L. REv. 641 (1941).
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issues of guilt, ignorance or mistake of law is viewed as a proper
74
factor to be considered in sentencing.
The existence of the principle that ignorance or mistake of law
is no defense is easy to document; it is somewhat more difficult to
determine the rationale for the rule in its application. A number of
justifications for the common law proposition that ignorance or mistake of law is no defense have been offered. Blackstone, who traced
the development of the doctrine back to Roman law, 75 justified the
principle on the basis that everyone is presumed to know the law.
"For a mistake in point of law, which every person of discretion not
only may, but is bound and presumed to know, is in criminal cases
76
no sort of defense."
Blackstone's justification for the rule has been rejected by most
commentators. 7 7 For example, Glanville Williams, after an extensive survey of the vast literature opposed to Blackstone's justification, concluded that "[t]he idea that the vast network of
governmental controls can be known by everyone is today more ludicrous than ever." 78 Similar opposition to Blackstone is found in
79
the writings of Jerome Hall.
Austin explained the rule on the basis of the difficulty of disproving a person's ignorance.8 0 Holmes answered Austin by pointing out that disproving a person's ignorance is no more difficult
81
than many issues faced by courts.
More cogent justifications for the principle center around the
educative, standard-setting function of the criminal law.8 2 Holmes'
predilection for objective liability justified his rejection of a mistake
of law defense:
The true explanation of the rule is the same as that which accounts for the law's indifference to a man's particular temperament,
faculties, and so forth. Public policy sacrifices the individual to the
74 R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 925 (2D ED. 1969);J. SMITH & B. HOGAN, supra note 23,
at 54. See United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 965 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1976)(Leventhal, J.
dissenting).
75 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 69, at *27.
76 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 69, at *27.
77 Glanville Williams summarizes some of the more telling rejections of Blackstone:
Lord Mansfield drily remarked that "it would be very hard upon the profession, if
the law was so certain, that everybody knew it"; and Maule J. is credited with the
observation that "everybody is presumed to know the law except His Majesty's
judges, who have a Court of Appeals set over them to put them right."
G. WILLIAM, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 290 (2d ed. 1961)(footnotes omitted).
78 Id.
79 J. HALL, supra note 22, at 376.
80 1 J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 497 (3d ed. 1869).
81 O.W. Holmes, THE COMMON LAw 48 (1881).
82 See supra note 19.
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general good. . . . It is no doubt true that there are many cases in
which the criminal could not have known that he was breaking the law,
but to admit the excuse at all would be to encourage ignorance where
the law-maker has determined to make men know and obey, and justice to the individual is rightly
outweighed by the larger interests on
83
the other side of the scales.
Jerome Hall expounded on the use of the normative function for
rejecting the mistake of law defense:
Now comes a defendant who truthfully pleads that he did not
know that his conduct was criminal, implying that he thought it was
legal. This may be because he did not know that any relevant legal
prohibition existed (ignorance) or, if he did know any potentially relevant rule, that he decided it did not include his intended situation or
conduct (mistake). In either case, such defenses always imply that the
defendant thought he was acting legally. If that plea were valid, the
consequences would be: whenever a defendant in a criminal case
thought the law was thus and so, he is to be treated as though the law
were thus and so, i.e. the law actually is thus and so. But such a doctrine
would contradict the essential requisites
of a legal system, the implica84
tions of the principle of legality.
In short, "[t]he criminal law represents an objective code of ethics
'85
which must prevail over individual convictions.
LaFave and Scott also suggest that accepting a mistake of law
defense would conflict with the principle of legality. That principle
requires that "rules of law express objective meanings which are declared by competent officials." '8 6 Allowing an individual to determine the content of the law is opposed to the notion of a properly
promulgated law equally binding upon all.
The common law, therefore, has concluded generally that ignorance or mistake of law will neither justify nor excuse the violation
of the criminal law. The need to set community standards requires
that the law not excuse conduct even if the actor did not realize that
his actions were prohibited. The actor's mistake or ignorance may
be considered in regard to punishment, but only if a reduced sentence would not undermine the required educative effect of the
criminal law. Surely to reward an individual for being ignorant of
the law would be counterproductive. There is, however, a subset of
cases in which the common law has had difficulty applying its general proposition that ignorance or mistake of law is no defense. Of
particular relevance here is the issue of how the law should judge
83 O.W. HOLMES, supra note 81, at 48.
84 J. HALL, supra note 22, at 382-83.
85 J. SMrrn & B. HOGAN, supra note 23, at 56.
86 W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 24, at 364.
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criminal actions performed after the actor has received advice concerning the legality of his actions.
B.

RELIANCE UPON AN INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW

The common law infrequently has been faced with situations in
which a criminal defendant sought advice as to an act's legality from
a government official, private counsel or other source before committing the criminal act. The case law has remained fairly consistent
in denying a defense of reliance upon the advice of private counsel.8 7 However, the few courts which have wrestled with the prosecution of a defendant who has relied on the advice of a public official
have reached differing results. These cases tend to fall into three
general fact patterns. First, there are those cases in which the defendant was indiscriminate in seeking out a public official for advice.
For example, inJones v. State,s8 the defendant was convicted of operating his saloon on election day. The defendant sought to justify his
actions on the ground that an officer told him he could open his
saloon after the polls had closed.8 9 In upholding the conviction the
court concluded that "[i]gnorance of a law cannot be pleaded injustification of its violation." 90 Courts have consistently rejected the
mistake of law defense in cases within this first category. 9 1
Second, there are those cases in which a defendant seeks advice
from an official who arguably has some special responsibility for
enforcing or administering the law. Often these cases result in an
acceptance of the defense of reliance upon the governmental advice.
In Raley v. Ohio,9 2 Raley was brought before the Ohio Un-American
Activities Committee to answer questions about subversive activities
in the labor movement. The Committee told Raley that he had a
right to remain silent under the privilege against self-incrimination
afforded by the Ohio Constitution. 93 Raley was eventually prosecuted for not responding to the Committee's question and his conviction was affirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court.9 4 The Ohio
87 See, e.g., State v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 12 NJ. 468, 97 A.2d 480, appeal
dismissed, 346 U.S. 869 (1953); Crichton v. Victorian Dairies, [1965] V.R. 49 (Vict. Sup.

Ct. 1964).
88 32 Tex. Crim. 533, 25 S.W. 124 (Crim. App. 1894).
89 Id. at 534, 25 S.W. at 124.
90 Id., 25 S.W. at 124.
91 See State v. Simmons, 143 N.C. 613, 56 S.E. 701 (1907).
92 360 U.S. 423 (1959).
93 "No person shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself." OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10.

94 State v. Morgan, 164 Ohio St. 529, 133 N.E.2d 104 (1956), vacated and remanded,
354 U.S. 929 (1957), adhered to, 167 Ohio St. 295, 147 N.E 2d 847 (1958), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part sub nom. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959).
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Supreme Court held that the privilege was not available to Raley
and that "neither ignorance of the law nor a mistake in its interpretation affords a valid defense." 9 5 The witness knew or is presumed
to know the law and "cannot be heard to say in one breath that he
knows enough of the law to claim the privilege against self-incrimination and in the next breath that he knows nothing of the immunity
statute, or that he has misconstrued it."96 In reversing Raley's con-

viction, eight members of the United States Supreme Court held:
While there is no suggestion that the Commission had any intent to
deceive the appellants, we repeat that to sustain the judgment of the
Ohio Supreme Court on such a basis after the Commission had acted
as it did would be to sanction the most indefensible sort of entrapment
by the state-convicting a citizen for exercising
a privilege which the
97
state clearly told him was available to him.

In Cox v. Louisiana,98 the Supreme Court relied upon Raley to
overturn convictions of demonstrators who had demonstrated
"near" a courthouse. 9 9 The convictions were reversed because the
"highest police officials of the city, in the presence of the Sheriff and
Mayor" told the demonstrators that they could meet if they remained 101 feet from the courthouse steps.' 0 0
Perhaps the most famous case falling in the category of mistake
of law defenses arising from advice from a public official is United
States v. Barker,'0 1 one of the Watergate cases. In Barker, the defendants Barker and Martinez argued successfully to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that they were entitled to a
jury instruction on a limited mistake of law defense.10 2 Two judges
adopted the basic premise that Barker and Martinez should be able
to defend charges that they conspired to violate the civil rights of
Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist by proving that they had relied upon
the authority of E. Howard Hunt to authorize the break-in.
Although the two judges in the majority took slightly different approaches to the mistake of law issue,1 03 both judges relied upon
95

Id. at 544, 133 N.E.2d at 115.

96

Id., 133 N.E.2d at 115.

97
98

Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 438 (1958).

379 U.S. 559 (1965).
99 Id. at 571.
100 Id.
101 546 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
102 Id. at 945.
103 Judge Wilkey relied upon a broader theory of mistake of law which would allow
the defense if a defendant could prove (1) facts justifying reasonable reliance upon an
official's apparent authority and (2) a legal theory on which to base a reasonable belief
that the official possessed such authority. Id. at 949. Judge Merhige relied more closely
on the official interpretation doctrine of the Model Penal Code. Id. at 955 57.
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Hunt's past CIA experience with the defendants and Hunt's relationship to Erlichman and the White House from which he had at
1
least apparent authority to issue orders for the burglary. 04
The third category of mistake of law defenses are those cases in
which a defendant acts upon the advice or opinion of a public official whose duty it is to interpret the law. It is this category of cases
which is most directly relevant to an analysis of Leon, in which the
police officer relied upon an official interpretation of the fourth
amendment by a magistrate.
C.

RELIANCE UPON AN OFFICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW

1.

The Common Law Cases

Reliance upon an official interpretation of the law surfaces in
the common law in two major fact patterns. The first pattern is exemplified by State v. Davis 10 5 and involves reliance upon non-judicial
opinions regarding the substance of the law. Davis was convicted of
accepting ajob of airport manager at a time when he was a member
of the County Board of Supervisors. Prior to accepting the position,
Davis sought advice from the Corporation Counsel and the Assistant District Attorney,1 0 6 both of whom approved Davis' acceptance
of the position. Davis was convicted of violating a Wisconsin statute, but his conviction was overturned by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court:
[W]e do not fault the general rule... that ignorance of the law shall
provide no defense ....

It is our opinion that a blind application of

such a rule would violate the principle of "fundamental fairness" implicit in our jurisprudence system. The prosecution of an individual
who relies on the legal opinion of a governmental official who is statutorily required to so opine would,
in our opinion, impose an uncon07
scionable rigidity in the law.1
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in keeping with the intention of
the Model Penal Code, limited the mistake of law defense to reliance
104 In dissent, Judge Leventhal strongly criticized the application of the official interpretation doctrine and its variants to the Watergate burglars.
The official misstatement of law defense embodies a fundamental requirement that
the erroneous interpretation be made by an official in fact possessing the power to
make a binding interpretation; it is wholly inapplicable to a case like this, of a claim
of reliance on a government official in an area in which he has no power to interpret. And it is a blatant incongruity to stretch an escape clause for mistakes of law
arising in the innately public business of official interpretations of law to immunize a
secret conference for planning a stealthy entry into a private home or office.
Id. at 969 (Levanthal, J., dissenting).
105 63 Wis. 2d 75, 216 N.W.2d 31 (1974).
106 Id. at 79, 216 N.W.2d at 32-33.
107 Id. at 81-82, 216 N.W.2d at 34.
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upon "the legal opinion of a governmental officer whose statutorily
created duties include the rendering of legal opinions as to actions
of specific individuals or groups."1 0 8 This qualification placed upon
the mistake of law defense by the Wisconsin Supreme Court was
precisely the missing qualification which caused Judge Leventhal to
dissent in Barker.'0 9 Although this first fact pattern is not directly
analogous to Leon, it will be useful later in the discussion of limitations to be placed upon Leon.
A second pattern is formed by those cases in which an actor has
relied upon a statute or a judicial decision which subsequently is
determined to be unconstitutional, illegal or wrong. This fact pattern is directly analogous to the Leon problem. In terms of reliance
upon judicial decisions, two issues have risen. The first issue is
whether it is reasonable to rely upon a lower court decision which
has not yet reached the highest appellate court. 110 Appellate courts
have generally found such reliance to be reasonable."' The second
issue is whether one can reasonably rely on a court decision in a case
in which the actor was not a party."12 The case law has generally
held that reliance upon a lower court decision, even by a non-party,
is reasonable and will be accepted as a defense to a criminal
13
prosecution.
2.

The Model Penal Code Approach

In its attempt to resolve issues raised in the official interpretation category, the Model Penal Code has tended to follow the common law and has adopted limited exceptions to the basic principle
that mistake of law is no defense. It is these exceptions which are
helpful in analyzing Leon. Section 2.04(3), "Ignorance or Mistake as
a Defense," provides:
(3) A belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a
defense to a prosecution for that offense based upon such conduct
when:
(b) [the defendant] acts in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous,
contained in (i) a statute or other enactment; (ii) a judicial decision,
opinion or judgment; (iii) an administrative order or grant of permission; or (iv) an official interpretation of the public officer or body
Id. at 82, 216 N.W.2d at 34.
546 F.2d at 969 (Levanthal, J., dissenting).
110 See, e.g., State v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 513, 126 N.W. 454 (1910).
III See, e.g., Hall & Seligman, supra note 73, at 671-73.
112 State v. Black, 177 Ind. App. 588, 598-99, 380 N.E.2d 1261, 1268 (1978).
113 See W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 24, at 367.
108
109
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charged by law with responsibility for the interpretation,
administra4

tion or enforcement of the law defining the offense.' 1
Although the Model Penal Code provision was drafted with "some
statutory and decisional support ....

[t]here was much contrary au-

thority."1 15 The Model Penal Code formulation of a limited mistake of law defense is clearly intended not to apply to category one
cases such as Jones v. StateI16 and clearly intended to apply to category three cases such as Davis. 1 7 Whether the provision applies to
' 8
cases such as Barker "is left to interpretation."
Although many states have relied generally upon the Model Penal Code in statutory revisions" 9 or in fashioning judicial opinions, 120 section 2.04(3) has not been universally embraced. Even
though some revised criminal codes have incorporated subsection
3(b) in its entirety,' 2 ' and some courts have adopted subsection 3(b)
by decision, 2 2 other states have made rather serious changes to the
Model Penal Code proposal. Arizona, for example, specifically rejected subsection 3(b) and allows a mistake of law defense only if the
123
conduct was authorized by the direction of a court.
3.

Rationalesfor the Common Law and Model Penal Code Approaches to
Reliance Upon Official Interpretation

Three separate but interrelated reasons support the adoption
of a mistake of law defense in situations in which the actor relied
upon an official statement of the law: 1) the lack of culpability of the
actor; 2) the "entrapment" of the actor by the state; and 3) the need
to encourage actors to seek official guidance.
Some sources justify the limited mistake of law defense on the
basis that the actor who relies upon an official statement of the law is
not a person upon whom the criminal law should operate-the person is not criminally culpable for his acts. The commentary to the
Model Penal Code makes this point:
All of the categories dealt with in the formulation involve, for the
most part, situations where the act charged is consistent with the en114 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 (Official Draft 1962).
115 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 comment (Rev. Comment
116 32 Tex. Crim. 533, 25 S.W. 124 (Crim. App. 1894);

1985).
see supra text accompanying

notes 88-90.
117 63 Wis. 2d 75, 216 N.W.2d 31 (1974); see supra text accompanying notes 105-08.
§ 2.04 comment (Rev. Comment 1985).
119 Id.
120 See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
121 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 52(4)(A) (1982); NJ. REV. STAT. § 2c:24(c)(I) (1982).
122 See, e.g., Ostrosky v. State, 704 P.2d 786, 792 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
118 MODEL PENAL CODE

123 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 13-402 (1978).
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tire law-abidingness of the actor, where the possibility of collusion is
minimal, and where a judicial determination of the reasonableness of
the belief in legality should not present substantial difficulty. It is
hard, therefore, to see how any purpose can be served by a conviction.
And obviously the defense afforded by this section would normally be
available to a defendant only once; after a warning he can hardly
have
124
a reasonable basis for belief in the legality of his behavior.
The culpability rationale has been used to justify the formulation of section 609 of the Final Report of the National Commission
on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws. 1 25 The official commentary to
section 609 explains the rationale for the rule:
Section [609] provides a defense (unless a law expressly provides
otherwise) for a person (a) who has taken affirmative steps to assure
himself that conduct in which he proposes to engage will not violate
the law and (b) who, as a result of having taken such steps and in reliance on whatever information he may already have had, believes reasonably and firmly that the conduct will not violate the law. Such a
person should not incur criminal liability. With respect to the law, his
conduct is not culpable, within the framework of a system of definite
positive laws. He has done all that can reasonably be expected to conform his conduct to the law. There is no room for deterrence in such
circumstances without either imposing on persons an unreasonable
burden to study the law or, in effect, limiting
their conduct more
26
broadly than the criminal law intends to do.'
Section 610 was not adopted by Congress in the Crime Control Act
of 1984.127
Judge Bazelon, in circumstances such as Barker, would equate
the rationale for a limited mistake of law defense as not significantly
departing from the principle of "conventional morality which finds
recognition in the defense of mistake of fact."' 28 Bazelon concludes
that "[t]o effect retribution upon an individual without consideration of his state of mind seems too barbarous for discussion and in
any event the law has moved beyond retribution as a prime justifica29
tion for the criminal sanction."'
As Fletcher notes, however, the Model Penal Code defense can124 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 comment (Revised Comment 1985).
125 U.S. NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 52-53 (1971).
126 1 U.S. NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS ON
THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS

139

(1970).

127 In State v. Lang, 378 N.W.2d 205 (N.D. 1985), the court relied upon § 610 to deny
a mistake of law defense where the defendant had urged that his mistake of law was
based upon a legal brief filed in a separate case.
128

United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 236 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 421 U.S. 1013

(1975).
129 Id. at

231.
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not be totally justified on the culpability of the actor. The Model
Penal Code defense excludes total ignorance of the law and reliance
upon unofficial advice as defenses even though the reliance may be
as reasonable, in some circumstances, as reliance upon an official
interpretation.1 30 In Fletcher's words, the Model Penal Code is
more accurately premised on a notion resembling the defense of reliance upon superior orders. 1 3 ' By ignoring many sources of mistaken information justifying a defendant's actions, the Model Penal
Code introduces a concept of "reasonableness" and thereby negates
a rationale which relies solely on the personal culpability of the
actor.
Related to the culpability rationale for the Model Penal Code
defense is the entrapment rationale: By relying on official advice,
the actor has been trapped into acting. Although one cannot form a
firm conclusion concerning the reason why some state legislatures
chose to adopt subsection 3(b) of the Model Penal Code while
others rejected or substantially amended the provision, a few courts
which have relied upon subsection 3(b) have given an insight into
their view of the purpose of the subsection. Some recent cases see
the mistake of law defense as "the criminal analogue of estoppel."' 13 2 It is unfair to punish an actor who has been "entrapped" by
the information provided by a public official. In some ways the actor
seems less culpable because he has been encouraged to commit the
act. Entrapment, however, includes something in addition to lessened culpability; entrapment includes the notion that it is unseemly
for government to act in this way. But the entrapment rationale suffers some of the same difficulties as the culpability rationale. It may
be just as unfair to punish a person who is "entrapped" by any public official as it is to punish a person who is "entrapped" by an official who falls within the rubric of subsection 3(b).
A third rationale, encouraging people to seek advice from a limited group of public officials, seems best to justify the common law
and Model Penal Code's mistake of law defense. It is also this rationale which best justifies the Supreme Court's decision in Leon.
In Ostrosky v. State, 13 3 the defendant was convicted of fishing
without a valid limited entry permit. In post-conviction relief, Ostrosky successfully had the fishing statute held unconstitutional. Os130

G.

FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW

757 (1978).

131 Id.
132 See, e.g., Free Enter. Canoe Renters Ass'n of Mo. v. Watt, 711 F.2d 852, 857 (8th
Cir. 1983).
133 704 P.2d 786 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
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trosky continued to fish. 13 4 The constitutionality of the fishing
statute was eventually upheld by the Alaska Supreme Court, 3 5 and
Ostrosky was tried for his second fishing expedition. 3 6 In allowing
a limited defense based upon Ostrosky's mistake of law as to the
fishing violation, the Alaska Court of Appeals held that Ostrosky was
entitled to rely upon the trial court's decision that the statute was
unconstitutional. "The policy behind this rule is to encourage people to learn and know the law; a contrary rule would reward intentional ignorance of the law."' 3 7 The court of appeals rejected the
state's argument that it is unreasonable, as a matter of law, for a
38
person to rely on a decision of a trial court.'
In order to accept this rationale of the encouragement of seeking information, one must first posit that society wants to encourage
its citizens to seek information from public officials before acting.
Society pays a price by acknowledging any form of mistake of law
defense but also pays a price, in terms of public perception of fairness, if the law fails to account in some way and in some circumstances for a mistake of law. It is not unfair to punish individuals if
society wants to discourage people from seeking information from
public officials or warns its citizens that the information is gratuitous
and will have no subsequent impact on prosecution. One must posit
that encouraging citizens to seek clarification from public officials
outweighs any erosion of the authority of the legislature that such a
defense may cause. One must also posit that the benefit of the limited mistake of law defense outweighs the benefit which society
gains when it encourages persons not to act in those situations in
which there is doubt as to the legality of the particular act.
The Model Penal Code chose to encourage citizens to seek
legal advice, even though that advice subsequently may be found to
be erroneous and therefore in conflict with a legislative decision.
The Model Penal Code drafters decided to "reward" the misinformed citizen in a way in which it does not reward the truly ignorant or the person who has sought advice from someone outside the
134

Id. at 788 89.

135 State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1983), appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1204

(1984).
136 Ostrosky v. State, 704 P.2d 786, 789 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
137 Id. at 791.
138 Id. at 792. A similar result can be found in State v. Black, 177 Ind. App. 588, 380
N.E.2d 1261 (1978), in which the Indiana Court of Appeals held that a criminal defendant could rely upon an unappealed trial court judgment striking down a massage parlor
ordinance as unconstitutional. A person could rely upon the trial court's decision until
"the publication of this opinion" in which the appellate court upheld the regulation of
massage parlors. Id. at 597, 380 N.E.2d at 1268.
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"official" spectrum. In other words, the Model Penal Code rejected
a defense that would excuse conduct if the actor was unaware of the
illegality of his act or was mistaken as to the illegality of his act because he relied on a reasonable source of information. Rather, the
Code adopted a defense which encourages potential actors to seek
information from a limited number of sources before acting. By
noting the similarity between the mistake of law defense and the
good faith exception in Leon, and by acknowledging that the mistake
of law defense intends to reward persons who seek official advice,
one can focus on the wisdom of the Court's decision in Leon and
suggest ways in which Leon should be interpreted.
V.
A.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE ANALOGY

IDENTIFYING A RATIONALE FOR LEON

Three possible justifications for the Court's creation of a good
faith exception in Leon come to the fore when one analyzes Leon in
terms of the rationales for a limited mistake of law defense in the
official interpretation situation. First, it can be argued that excluding evidence when the officer gathered evidence in reliance upon a
warrant is punishing the officer undeservedly. 13 9 Second, excluding
evidence when the officer relied on a warrant is unfair, just as it was
unfair to punish Raley for contempt after he relied upon official advice. 140 An officer should not be punished because he has received
official advice which has entrapped him into conducting an illegal
search; it is unseemly for a government to trick persons into violating the law. 14 ' Third, by acknowledging a mistake of law defense,
society encourages persons to seek information before acting and by
allowing a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule when the
search is pursuant to a warrant, society encourages police to seek
14 2
official guidance regarding the existence of probable cause.
The justification for a limited mistake of law defense based on a
lack of culpability is inapplicable to Leon for a number of reasons.
First, the exclusionary rule is not a remedy directed personally to
the police officer.' 43 The exclusionary rule is an institutional rem139

See supra text accompanying notes 110-13.

140 See Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959); supra text accompanying note 16.
141 See supra text accompanying note 132.
142 See supra text accompanying notes 133-38.
143 It is never totally clear who justice White believes the exclusionary rule acts on as
a deterrent:
We have frequently questioned whether the exclusionary rule can have any deterrent effect when the offending officers acted in the objectively reasonable belief that
their conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment.... But even assuming that
the rule effectively deters some police misconduct and provides incentives for the
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edy. 144 It is directed at the state in its prosecutorial function. 14 5
The due process issues raised by the Supreme Court in Raley 14 6 are
simply inapplicable to Leon. Unlike Raley, in which the actor was led
to believe his course of conduct was proper and then was punished
for his actions, in Leon it is not the actor (the police officer), but
rather the state which suffers the consequences of the police officer's actions when the evidence gathered pursuant to an invalid
warrant is excluded. It is irrelevant whether the officer exhibits the
degree of culpability for which the criminal law seeks punishment.
In fact, the officer is not to be punished at all.
The mistake of law analysis of Leon, however, shows quite
clearly the impact that would be felt if the exclusionary rule were
147 If
replaced by a remedy directed to the individual police officer.
the remedy for a fourth amendment violation was personal and noninstitutional, 148 issues of fairness from Raley 14 9 and issues of reliance from Ostrosky15 0 would become relevant as to penalties aslaw enforcement profession as a whole to conduct itself in accord with the Fourth
Amendment, it cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to deter objectively
reasonable law enforcement activity.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 918.
In dissent, Justice Brennan argues that the exclusionary rule is primarily an institutional remedy:
The flaw in the Court's argument, however, is that its logic captures only one comparatively minor element of the generally acknowledged deterrent purposes of the
exclusionary rule. To be sure, the rule operates to some extent to deter future
misconduct by individual officers who have had evidence suppressed in their own
cases. But what the Court overlooks is that the deterrence rationale for the rule is
not designed to be, nor should it be thought of as, a form of "punishment" of
individual police officers for their failure to obey the restraints imposed by the
Fourth Amendment.... Instead, the chief deterrent function of the rule is its tendency to promote institutional compliance with Fourth Amendment requirements
on the part of law enforcement agencies generally. Thus, as the Court has previously recognized, "over the long term, [the] demonstration [provided by the exclusionary rule] that our society attaches serious consequences to violation of
constitutional rights is thought to encourage those who formulate law enforcement
policies, and the officers who implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment
ideals into their value system." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 492. It is only through
such an institution wide mechanism that information concerning Fourth Amendment standards can be effectively communicated to rank and file officers.
Id. at 953 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
144 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Alschuler, supra note 51, at 333; Kamisar, supra
note 12, at 611.
145 Kamisar, supra note 12, at 611.
146 360 U.S. 423 (1959); see supra text accompanying notes 92-97.
147 See generally 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 2, § 4.11, at 163-84 (1978).
148 Of course hybrid remedies-part institutional and part individual officer-might
be developed. Attorney General Meese has recently authorized the government to reimburse Justice Department employees for damages incurred as a result of violations of
constitutional rights. Arizona Republic, August 17, 1986, at A6, col.2.
149 360 U.S. 423 (1959); see supra text accompanying notes 92-97.
150 See supra text accompanying notes 133-38.
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sessed against the individual officer. One need merely look to
United States v. Screws 15 ' and its progeny 152 to anticipate the difficulties which may result if the primary remedy for fourth amendment
violations is directed to the officer in his individual capacity and not
in his capacity as a representative of the state.
In a similar vein, the entrapment unfairness rationale for Leon
must be dismissed. It is not unseemly to suppress evidence as long
as the remedy for a violation of the fourth amendment remains institutional and is not addressed to the personal interests of the individual police officer. In fact, one can argue that it is indeed very seemly
for a government to provide a review procedure which recognizes
the importance of a constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and thereby reinforces the importance of
such rights. The government is not entrapping officers to violate
the law and then punishing the officer. The government is merely
recognizing that its agent (the magistrate) may have committed an
error and now the state is providing a remedy for review of that
decision. If it is impossible to review the magistrate's decision prior
to the search, a post-search review may conclude that the search was
illegal. In short, it is not unfair, nor is it unseemly, to deny the state
the use of evidence when that evidence has been seized by its agent
contrary to law. One may argue that on balance it is unwise to exclude the evidence, but it is not unfair to either the state or the individual officer to do so.
The third justification for Leon which emerges from a mistake of
law analysis is that by recognizing the good faith exception, one is
"encouraging people to learn and know the law."' 153 The Court's
decision in Leon can be seen as a method of encouraging police officers to seek warrants before searches. This reading of Leon analogizes a police officer's seeking and executing a warrant to an
individual's acting pursuant to a court decision later found to be
erroneous.
The educative justification for Leon is more convincing than
either the reliance or entrapment justifications, but it is not without
its problems. The major difficulty with this justification for Leon is
that it assumes that police need to be encouraged to obtain warrants. 154 Such encouragement would seem unnecessary because the
151 325 U.S. 91 (1945). See C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 6163 (2d ed. 1986).
152 C. Whitebread & C. Slobogin, supra note 151, at 61-63.
153 See supra text accompanying notes 133-37.
154 It appears that the Supreme Court still maintains the position it stated in Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), that warrantless searches are presumptively uncon-
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law presently holds that searches without warrants are presumptively illegal.' 5 5 Therefore, the encouragement that Leon can provide is only necessary either in situations where it is unclear whether
a warrant is necessary' 5 6 or where there is concern that the police
may fabricate facts to justify an exception to the warrant requirement.' 5 7 Also, police may need additional encouragement to seek
warrants in those situations in which they presently conduct unconstitutional searches, knowing that standing requirements, 158 the use
of the evidence (other than in the prosecutor's case-in-chief)' 5 9 or
plea bargaining 160 will make their efforts worthwhile. For Leon to be
effective as an incentive to secure a warrant, the added benefit of
obtaining a warrant must be seen to outweigh the perceived inconvenience of the paperwork and the warrant application process.
Police may well view Leon as reducing the ambiguity of search
and seizure law. An officer may bring an application to a magistrate
knowing that if the magistrate finds the application faulty, the officer
stitutional. Justice Rehnquist, however, has led a fight to return to what he believes is
the correct rule of United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), which centers on the
existence of a search warrant as merely one factor in the analysis of reasonableness. See
C. WHrrEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIM, supra note 151, at 136-40.
155 Johnson, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). Professor Bradley predicts that Leon will increase the
use of warrants. Bradley, supra note 15, at 292. Studies done before Leon, however,
indicate that police often go out of their way to avoid applying for search warrants. See
McCoy, The Good Faith Warrant Cases- What PriceJudge-Shopping, 21 CRIM. L. BULL. 53, 6263 (1985).
156 There are many reasons which might lead to police uncertainty as to the need for a
warrant. First the fourth amendment case law is continually in a state of flux. For example, in Oklahoma v. Castleberry, 469 U.S. 979 (1985), the Court voted four to four,
thereby affirming the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, that police officers were
constitutionally required to obtain a search warrant before the police removed a suitcase
from a the trunk of a car in which suspected drugs were located. In addition, state
supreme courts appear more willing than ever to interpret their own state constitutions
inconsistently with decisions of the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976)(rejecting the standard for warrantless automobile
inventories); State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984)(rejecting Gates
standard). Therefore police officers may find that they are subject to two separate bodies of constitutional law regarding search and seizure, thus contributing to their
uncertainty.
157 The untruthful police officer may be able to avoid the rigors of the fourth amendment, and this possibility has always caused the system some degree of consternation.
See Garbus, Police Perjury: An Interview with Martin Garbus, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 363 (1972);
Grano, A Dilemmafor Defense Counsel: Spinelli-Harris Search Warrantsand the Possibility of
Police Perjuring, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 405. It may also be true in some situations that magistrates assist the police by "fudging" standards for probable cause. W. LAFAVE, supra
note 2, at 17. There is also the risk that officers may create an exigency, thus justifying a
warrantless search. See United States v. Webster, 750 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1984).
158 See 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 11.3, at 543-612 (1978).
159 Leon, 468 U.S. at 911.
160 Justice White noted this problem. Id. at 907 n.6.
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will have an opportunity to correct the deficiency. Also, the officer
knows that if the magistrate issues a search warrant, the evidence
will most likely be admissible at trial since the magistrate's decision
is virtually unreviewable. If the police perceive Leon as an "insurance policy" against subsequent appellate attack, the decision will
encourage more warrants and will reduce perjured testimony (e.g.,
testimony offered to show that there was an exigency justifying a
warrantless search). Leon may also be an incentive for the officer to
secure a warrant if the officer realizes that because of the good faith
exception of Leon and the relaxed probable cause standards of
Gates 161 a legally unassailable warrant may be easier to obtain. The
state may therefore be in a better plea bargaining position, or the
prosecution may be able to use the seized evidence in the prosecutor's case-in-chief. The standing rules, however, still act as a disincentive to the officer to search only on probable cause, whether the
search is warranted or warrantless.
The benefit of Leon in these limited cases must be balanced
against the fact that despite the good faith exception of Leon, an individual's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures has been violated with no apparent remedy. The failure to remedy the wrong sends a message to the community regarding fourth amendment rights: certain constitutional rights are
limited by the knowledge of the police officer. To this extent, the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule undercuts the standard setting function of the law. In the words of Justice Stevens in
Leon, the creation of the good faith exception "is to convert a bill of
1 62
Rights into an unenforced honor code."'
B.

LIMITING THE APPLICATION OF LEON TO WARRANTED SEARCHES

If one assumes that there is a need to encourage the police to
learn the law by seeking warrants (and therefore Leon was correctly
decided), the analogous use of the Model Penal Code official interpretation doctrine gives an insight into the limitations which courts
should place upon Leon. Section 2.04(3)(b) of the Model Penal
Code contains four types of official pronouncements which can
serve as a basis for a mistake of law defense. In addition to reliance
upon "a judicial decision, opinion or judgment,"1 63 reliance can be
161 462 U.S. 213 (1983); see supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
162 Leon, 468 U.S. at 978 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)(b)(ii) (Official Draft 1962); see supra text accompanying note 114.
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reasonably placed upon "a statute or other enactment,"' 164 "an administrative order or grant of permission,"'' 65 and "an official interpretation of the public officer or body charged by law with
responsibility for the interpretation, administration or enforcement
of the law defining the offense."' 16 6 If one permits a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule based upon the decision of a magistrate to issue a warrant, the question arises whether the other bases
found in section 2.04(3)(b) should, by analogy, be bases for other
good faith exceptions. The conclusion of this analysis is that Leon
must be limited to searches pursuant to a warrant and to a limited
number of searches conducted pursuant to statutes later held to be
unconstitutional. 6 7 Courts which issue warrants have been given
164 MODEL PENAL CODE

ing note 114.
165 MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 2.04(3)(b)(i) (Official Draft 1962); see supra text accompany§ 2.04(3) (b) (iii) (Official Draft 1962); see supra text accompany-

ing note 114.
166 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3) (b) (iv) (Official Draft 1962); see supra text accompanying note 114.
167 See infra text accompanying notes 170-78. A number of authors have expressed
the fear that Leon may be extended to warrantless searches. See, e.g., LaFave, supra note
10, at 926-29. Generally, most courts have agreed with this analysis and have refused to
extend Leon to warrantless searches and seizures. The Ninth Circuit in particular has
stated repeatedly that Leon does not apply to warrantless searches. "The Leon exception,
however, is clearly limited to warrantsinvalidated for lack of probable cause and does not
create the broad 'good faith' exception the government suggests ....
The Leon rule
should therefore not be applied to invalid warrantless searches." United States v. Whiting, 781 F.2d 692, 698 (9th Cir. 1986)(emphasis added). See United States v. Miller, 769
F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Merchant, 760 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.
granted, 106 S. Ct. 3293 (1986). See also United States v. Owens, 782 F.2d 146 (10th Cir.
1986); United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
2126 (1985); United States v. Broadhurst, 612 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. Cal. 1985); United
States v. Gilley, 608 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D. Ga. 1985).
Most state courts faced with this decision have also refused to extend Leon to warrantless searches. As the Illinois Court of Appeals noted, "This limited exception (the
good faith exception) to the exclusionary rule, however, was expressly created for
searches conducted pursuant to a warrant." People v. Ross, 133 Ill. App. 3d 66, 74, 478
N.E.2d 575, 580 (1985). See State v. Martin, 2 Conn. App. 605, 482 A.2d 70 (1984), cert.
denied, 195 Conn. 802, 488 A.2d 457, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2706 (1985); Albo v. State,
477 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); People v. Potter, 140 Ill. App. 3d 693, 489
N.E.2d 334 (1986); State v. Blair, 691 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct.
784 (1986); State v. Sugar, 100 NJ. 214,495 A.2d 90 (1985); Walls v. Commonwealth, 2
Va. App. 639, 347 S.E.2d 175 (1986). See also W. LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 34-36.
Additionally, several courts hint that Leon can be extended to plain view consent
searches, as well as nontestimonial identification orders. See United States v. Gilley, 608
F. Supp. 1065, 1069 (S.D. Ga. 1985) (The Leon principle "arguably applies to the consent
search, making suppression improper where an officer has searched in good faith reliance on the validity of a consent which he has received."); State v. Welch, 316 N.C. 734,
-, 342 S.E.2d 789, 795 (1986)(although defendant was subjected to warrantless blood
test, officer relied on nontestimonial identification order, so suppression inapplicable.
"We decline to apply the exclusionary rule to this good faith violation of the fourth
amendment. To apply the rule here would not serve to discourage police misconduct
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the primary function of deciding whether a search may be constitutionally conducted. The independent, neutral magistrate issues an
order-the warrant-which is a judgment that there is probable
cause to search a particular place for particular items. The decision
is made as a "judicial decision, opinion or judgment"' 16 8 even
though it may "afterward [be] determined to be invalid or
169
erroneous."
In a limited number of cases, Leon should be applied to evidence seized pursuant to a statute later held to be unconstitutional.
This corresponds to the second category of the Model Penal Code
section 2.04 "reliance upon a statute or other enactment." In cases
preceding Leon, such as Michigan v. De Fillippo, 7 0° the Supreme Court
held that in certain circumstances evidence seized by police pursuant to a statute subsequently declared unconstitutional will not be
suppressed.' 7 1 In De Fillippo, a defendant was arrested under a Detroit ordinance which made it unlawful for a person stopped under
suspicious circumstances to refuse to identify himself. In a search
pursuant to the arrest, drugs were found on the defendant. 72 "A
prudent officer, in the course of determining whether respondent
has committed an offense under all the circumstances shown by this
record, should not have been required to anticipate that a court
would later hold the ordinance unconstitutional."' 1 73 In Leon, however, the Court noted the limitations placed upon De Fillippo. "We
have held, however, that the exclusionary rule requires suppression
of evidence obtained in searches carried out pursuant to statutes,
not yet declared unconstitutional, purporting to authorize searches
74
and seizures without probable cause or search warrants."'
and would only defeat justice for no good reason."); United States v. Owens, 621 F.
Supp. 1498 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Simpson v. State, 709 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
168 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)(b)(ii) (Official Draft 1962); seesupra text accompanying note 114.
169 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)(b) (Official Draft 1962); seesupra text accompanying
note 114. One practical impact of the Leon decision is to make all future fourth amendment decisions apply prospectively only. See Alschuler, supra note 51, at 340 n.98.
170 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
171 Id. at 40.
172 Id. at 33-35.
173 Id. at 37-38. In dissent, Justice Brennan wrote that the good faith of the officer is
irrelevant,
for the dispute in this case is not between the arresting officers and respondent.
The dispute is between the respondent and the State of Michigan ....
Since the
state is responsible for the actions. . . of its police, the state can hardly defend
against this charge of unconstitutional conduct by arguing that the constitutional
defect was the product of legislative action and that the police were merely executing the laws in good faith.
Id. at 42-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(citation omitted).
174 Leon, 468 U.S. at 912 n.8. But see United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975). In
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This limitation placed upon De Fillippo is consistent with Leon
and with the analogous use of section 2.04(3)(b)(1), 7 5 because the
legislature is not the interpreter of the Constitution and therefore
cannot alter constitutional safeguards by statute. Yet, the legislature is the definer of criminal conduct which may lead to a police
officer's deciding he has probable cause to arrest an individual for a
crime defined by the legislature.1 7 6 In De Fillippo, the legislature was
operating within its area of authority. In cases such as Ybarra v. linois, 17 7 in which the legislature tried to define fourth amendment
rules, the legislature was not operating within its area of authority,
17 8
and this evidence should continue to be excluded after Leon.
In addition to reliance upon a statute, the Model Penal Code
also permits reliance upon an "other enactment"' 179 as a basis of a
mistake of law defense. It is conceivable, although neither the
Model Penal Code's commentary' 80 nor the case lawl s ' give any guidance on the issue, that "other enactment" includes administrative
regulations formally adopted through an administrative procedure.18 2 If an agency regulation may serve as a basis for a mistake of
law defense under section 2.04(3) (b) (iii), may police regulations
concerning searches and seizures serve as a basis for a good faith
Peltier,the Court refused to suppress evidence seized by Border Patrol agents who acted
pursuant to a federal statute later declared unconstitutional. As the Court noted, "It
was in reliance upon a validly enacted statute [8 U.S.C. § 1357(9)(3)], supported by
longstanding administrative regulations and continuous judicial approval, that Border
Patrol agents stopped and searched respondent's automobile." Id. at 541. The Court
reasoned that judicial integrity was not "offended" because "the law enforcement officers reasonably believed in good faith that evidence they had seized was admissible at
trial." Id. at 537.
175 See supra text accompanying note 114.
176 See LaFave, The FourthAmendment in An Imperfect World, 43 U. Prrr. L. REV. 307, 349
(1982).
177 444 U.S. 85 (1979). In Ybarra, an Illinois statute authorized searches of any persons found on premises searched pursuant to a search warrant. In striking down the
statute and ordering that the seized evidence be suppressed, the Court refrained from
discussing any issues relating to a good faith reliance by the officer upon the Illinois
statute. Id. at 90-96.
178 It seems inappropriate considering the Leon Court's comments in De Fillippo to
attempt to characterize a legislature under § 2.04(3)(b)(iv) as a "public officer or body
charged by law with responsibility for the interpretation" of the fourth amendment.
179 See supra text accompanying note 114.
180 The Model Penal Code Commentary to § 2.04(3)(b)(iii) does not define "other
enactment."
181 A search of the case law has found no cases interpreting the provision.
182 "Other enactments" might also include administrative interpretations of rules of
evidence, as was the situation in a series of cases recently decided by the Third Circuit.
According to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(C)(i), disclosure of grand jury
matters is allowed "when so directed by a court preliminary to or in connection with a
judicial proceeding." The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had used this rule to request
disclosure of grand jury transcripts and other documents for use in tax audits against
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exception to the exclusionary rule? Some police agencies have
promulgated rules which affect the manner in which searches are
conducted, 8 3 and in some situations the Supreme Court has given
significance to the fact that the search was conducted pursuant to
agency regulations. For example, in inventory cases such as South
Dakota v. Oppernan'8 4 and Illinois v. Lafayette,185 the Court refuted the

notion that the searches could be viewed as pretexts by noting that
the searches were conducted pursuant to agency guidelines. Some
commentators have argued that great deference should be paid to
the rules which police agencies have adopted.1 8 6 Yet, the Court has
refused to order the suppression of evidence merely because an
1 87
otherwise constitutional search violated agency rules.
The fact that an officer has relied upon an agency rule in conducting his search should not serve as a good faith justification for
admitting into evidence the fruits of that search.' 8 8 As the Court
noted in De Fillippo, regarding statutory authorization for searches
inconsistent with the fourth amendment, neither a statute nor, presumably, an agency rule can alter procedures which the fourth
amendment requires. 8 9 In addition, there seems to be no need to
encourage police officers to obey agency rules by rewarding the officers with a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. An officer should have professional reasons to operate within the
persons under investigation. However, the Supreme Court declared this procedure unconstitutional in United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476 (1983).
The Third Circuit, when faced with three cases where taxpayers challenged the IRS
summonses that resulted from the use of this now illegal procedure, relied on Leon and
Peltier in refusing to grant suppression of the evidence seized.
The conduct by the IRS agents in the cases before us is remarkably similar to the
conduct of the police officers in Peltier and Leon. Here, the IRS agents acted in good
faith reliance on a facially valid Rule 6(e) order issued by the United States District
Court. Under such circumstances, enforcement of the resultant summonses neither
will offend the integrity of the judicial process nor will refusal to enforce them deter
future misconduct by IRS agents.
Gluck v. United States, 771 F.2d 750, 758 (3d Cir. 1985)(footnotes omitted); see also
Caprio v. Commissioner, 787 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1986); Graham v. Commissioner, 770
F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1985).
183 See Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1974). See
generally Israel, Legislative Regulation of Searches and Seizures: The Michigan Proposals, 73
MICH. L. REV. 222, 222-24 (1975).
184 428 U.S. 364, 372 (1976).
185 462 U.S. 640, 646 (1983).
186 See, e.g., Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45
N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 810-15 (1970). See also Allen, The Police and Substantive Rulemaking:
Reconciling the Principleand the Expediency, 725 U. PA. L. REV. 62 (1976).
187 United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
188 See Dripps, supra note 9, at 945-46.
189 See supra text accompanying notes 170-87.
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guidelines established by his employer. 90 Finally, an officer could
seek confirmation of his use of agency rules when he seeks a search
warrant from a magistrate, or a police agency could seek confirmation of its guidelines, in certain circumstances, by using state declaratoryjudgment provisions.' 9 1 However, an agency regulation which
defines criminal conduct, such as a regulation of the Internal Revenue Service, may serve as the basis of a probable cause determination, just as the statute in De Fillippo served as the probable cause
basis for the arrest.
It is also conceivable to characterize police search and seizure
'
regulations as "an administrative order or grant of permission 192
which is the third Model Penal Code exception category. Although
the Model Penal Code Commentary is not very helpful, 93 and the
case law is undeveloped as to the meaning of "administrative order
or grant of permission,"' 94 it is reasonable to assume that the
phrases refer to quasi-judicial decisions made by agencies addressing specific fact situations. It is hard to perceive how this subsection
is helpful in an analysis of Leon.
The final category of section 2.04(3)(b) permits a mistake of law
defense based upon the "official interpretation of the public officer
or body charged by law with responsibility for the interpretation,
administration or enforcement of the law."' 19 5 Although a prosecutor is often the legal advisor to the police department' 9 6 and is in
some ways responsible for the "administration or enforcement" of
the fourth amendment, the Constitution has placed the duty of "advising" the police regarding the fourth amendment in the hands of
judicial officers. 197 From a practical perspective, a good faith exception founded upon police conduct pursuant to a prosecutor's advice
would negate the degree of neutrality required of issuing magistrates by the Court in Shadwick v. City of Tampa 198 and would allow a
prosecuting agency to benefit from the fruits of an illegal search by
insulating the evidence from suppression through an advisory opin190 This observation is not valid if the police department either intentionally or unintentionally rewards officers for the number of arrests made as opposed to the number of

constitutional arrests made.

111 (1975).
See supra text accompanying note 114.
193 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 comment (Revised Comment 1985). The commentary
to § 2.04, Tentative Draft No. 4 (1955), gives conflicting information regarding the in191 See UNIF. DEC. JUDG. AcT § 1, 12 U.L.A.
192

tent of this subsection.
194 A search of the case law has revealed no cases interpreting the provision.
195 See supra text accompanying note 114.
196 See, e.g., Israel, supra note 183, at 251.
197 See supra note 154.
198 407 U.S. 345 (1972).
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ion. Although the Court in Leon argued that magistrates are not deterred by the suppression of evidence ordered by a trial court, 99
even the Supreme Court would not make that argument concerning
prosecutors. In fact, in Leon, the application for the search warrant
"was reviewed by several Deputy District Attorneys." 20 0 The prosecuting agency should not be given a mechanism whereby it can
avoid constitutional restrictions.
C.

ALTERING THE WARRANT PROCESS

1.

Magistrate Qualifications

Not only does an analogous use of the mistake of law doctrine
argue for a limitation of Leon to warranted search cases; theanalogy
also calls for additional refinements designed to make the issuance
of a warrant truly the product of a judicial decision. The refinements require a close scrutiny of magistrates' qualifications and warrant procedures. One might view the exceptions to the good faith
rule created by the Court in Leon as a start in that direction, as they
contain some of the basic hallmarks of a true judicial decision. For
example, no court should rule without sufficient available facts and
therefore the good faith exception will not apply if the magistrate
was recklessly misled. A "rubber stamp" magistrate-a magistrate
who abandons his judicial role-is not one who makes judicial decisions. If Leon, and the pre-eminence it gives to magistrates' decisions, is to guide search and seizure law, other aspects of the
magistrate system need attention.
Fourth amendment jurisprudence is centered on the need for a
"neutral and detached" magistrate to determine, before a search is
conducted, whether there is probable cause to search.2 0 ' The Court
in Leon reiterated the constitutional preference for warrants and relied upon its earlier holdings which held that: "a search warrant
provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is a
more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the hurried
judgment of a law enforcement officer engaged in the often compet20 2
itive enterprise of ferreting out crime."
199 Leon, 468 U.S. at 917.
200 Id. at 902.
201 Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972). As previously suggested, what
constitutes the abandonment of a magistrate's judicial role is ill defined. Clearly, the

Court has provided examples of the extremes, i.e., the magistrate who actively participates in the seizure of obscene material in an adult bookstore, Lo-Ji Sales v. New York,
442 U.S. 319 (1979), or the magistrate who presigns 50 arrest warrants for distribution

by his clerk, Stewart v. State, 289 Ark. 272, 711 S.W.2d 787 (1986).
202 Leon, 468 U.S. at 913-14.
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As long as the magistrate does not rely on an affidavit which is
knowingly or recklessly false, 20 3 does not act as an "adjunct law enforcement officer," 20 4 and does not base probable cause on a "bare
bones" affidavit, 20 5 the practical outcome of Leon is to make the
magistrate's decision unreviewable.2 0 6 Nothing in the Court's opinion is directed to the serious question of magistrate quality. It is not
sufficient that a magistrate is "neutral and detached." A magistrate,
particularly a magistrate whose decisions on issues of constitutional
law are unreviewable, must be "informed and current" not just
"neutral and detached. ' 20 7
The need for an informed magistracy raises the far reaching
question of whether our legal system is willing to allow questions
regarding constitutional rights to be made by persons with no legal
training whose decisions are virtually unreviewable. If the answer is
that we are willing to accept such unreviewable decisions on search
and seizures issues, we must reconsider the issue of lay magistrates
and magistrate qualifications in general raised in Shadwick v. City of
Tampa 20 8 and North v. Russell.20 9 In Shadwick, a unanimous Court
held that municipal court clerks could constitutionally issue arrest
warrants. "These clerks qualify as neutral and detached magistrates
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment." 2 10 "We find no commandment... that all warrant authority must reside exclusively in a
lawyer or judge." 2 11 The issuing magistrate must meet two tests:
he must be neutral and detached, and "he must be capable of determining whether probable cause exists for the requested arrest or
search." 21 2 Although it might be more desirable to have the decision to issue a warrant made by a judge or a lawyer, such requirements are not constitutionally mandated. 21 3 However, it must be
noted at the time of the Court's decision in Shadwick, determinations
21 4
of probable cause were subject to the scrutiny of Aguilar-Spinelli,
203 Id. at 914.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 915.
206 See Alschuler, supra note 51, at 322. See supra note 55.
207 For a discussion of magistrates' qualifications and job description, see L. SILBERMAN, NON ATrORNEYJUSTICE IN THE UNrrED STATES: AN EMPIRICAL SrUDY (1979); Barrett, CriminalJustice: The Problem of Mass Production, in THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, THE
COURT, THE PUBLIC AND LAw EXPLOSION 85, 117-18 (A. Jones ed. 1965).

208 407 U.S. 345 (1972).
209 427 U.S. 328 (1976).
210 Shadwick, 407 U.S. at 346.
211 Id. at 349.
212 Id. at 350.

213 Id. at 353-54.
214 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410
(1969).
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and an officer's reliance on a warrant did not make the decision to
issue the warrant unreviewable in a subsequent adversarial
proceeding.
In North v. Russell,2 1 5 North argued that the right to counsel discussed in Argesinger v. Hamlin2 16 and Gideon v. Wainwright2 1 7 was
meaningless unless a law-trained judge was required to rule on
counsel's arguments. 21 8 In upholding the constitutionality of Kentucky's two-tier trial court system, Chief Justice Burger relied upon
the fact that a person sentenced to imprisonment by a non-lawtrained judge had a right to a de novo trial before a law-trained judge
if the individual chose to exercise that right. 2 19 In a strongly
worded dissent, Justice Stewart argued that a judge ignorant of the
law is incapable of performing functions required by the due process clause. 220 Justice Stewart said he could not agree that "these
constitutional deficiencies can all be swept under the rug and forgotten because the convicted defendant may have a trial de novo
' 22 1
before a qualified judge.
In both Shadwick and North, the Court relied on the fact that
decisions by non-law-trained individuals were reviewable. A system
which makes such decisions unreviewable must be concerned with
the quality of these decisions. An unreviewable system is likely to
make the least stringent magistrate the busiest magistrate. An unreviewable system based on police good faith may also mean that
prosecutors may no longer screen warrant applications, possibly in
part because they may realize that their review might impugn an officer's good faith if the review indicates legal problems with the warrant application. 2 22 Some court systems, relying on the
unreviewability of the magistrate's decision, may even take Leon as a
signal to hire issuing magistrates who are less law-trained than present magistrates, believing that they will be more readily directed by
the police. 2 23 Although requiring that issuing magistrates be lawtrained is no guarantee that a magistrate will be informed and his
knowledge current, there is a greater likelihood that this will be
215 427 U.S. 328 (1976).
216 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
217 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
218 North, 427 U.S. at 334.
219 Id. at 335-37.
220 Id. at 342 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

Id. at 345 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
See Israel,supra note 183, at 251; Wasserstrom &Mertens, supra note 10, at 114-15.
See also W. LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 20-21; Dripps, supra note 9, at 930.
223 Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 10, at 108-09.
221

222
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true. 2 24 There are, of course, costs in requiring that issuing magis-

trates be law-trained persons, but there are also serious costs when
unreviewable decisions on constitutional rights are made by nonlaw-trained magistrates.
2. ProceduralChanges
If our legal system is willing to allow unreviewable decisions
regarding search and seizure questions to be resolved by non-lawtrained persons, care must surely be taken to make magistrate decisions more closely approximate decisions made in other areas. It
seems ironic that a magistrate's determination in a fifty dollar collection matter more closely approaches the traditional due process
model than a magistrate's decision on the protection afforded by the
2 25
fourth amendment.
After reading Leon, two needed changes spring immediately to
mind. First, if the magistrate's decision regarding the scope of
fourth amendment rights will be practically unreviewable and the
decision will be made in an exparte proceeding, police must have the
obligation to present all relevant facts to the magistrate. It can be
strongly argued that the Gates "totality of circumstances" test already places this requirement upon the police. 22 6 Therefore, if an
officer intends to bolster the reliability of an informant by detailing
224 See Stringer v. State, 491 So. 2d 837 (Miss. 1986). "Nothing less than 'the integrity
of the criminal justice process' is placed in jeopardy in Leon. This is particularly so in a
state like Mississippi where most judges issuing search warrants have had no formal
legal training." Id. at 850 (Robertson,J., concurring)(citation omitted)(quoting State v.
Novembrino, 200 NJ. Super. 229, 244, 491 A.2d 37, 45 (1985)).
225 See generally 511 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2934 (1973).
226 See W. LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 23. But see Point v. State, 102 Nev. 33, 717 P.2d 38
(1986). In Point, the defendants argued that the affidavit prepared in support of a search
warrant for their home was invalid because the affiant failed to include the fact that the
informant was jailed and had a criminal record. This omission, defendant argued, indicated bad faith on the part of the affiant, thereby justifying suppression under Leon. In
rejecting this argument, the Nevada Supreme Court stated that Leon "does not stand for
appellant's proposition that the detective's failure to include all facts of which he may
have knowledge concerning the character of an informant establishes bad faith of the
officer justifying suppression of evidence." Id. at 41, 717 P.2d 38, 42-43.
Similarly, in State v. Washington, 482 So. 2d 171 (La. Ct. App. 1986), the court
announced that under Leon, the "good or the bad faith of the affiant officer becomes
relevant only where a search warrant is found defective." Id. at 174. Thus even though
the court agreed with the defendant that statements contained in the affidavit could have
been expressed in a clearer fashion, it refused to examine evidence of the officer's prior,
specific search warrant affidavits to determine whether the officer acted in bad faith
when signing this affidavit. Cf. United States v. Reivich, 610 F. Supp. 538 (W.D. Mo.
1985)(Leon inapplicable where the officers failed to include information in the affidavit
regarding inducements given to witnesses to obtain information), rev'd, 793 F.2d 957
(8th Cir. 1986).
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past times in which the informer has been reliable, the officer must
also be under a responsibility to relate those times in which the informant was proven to be wrong. If a police officer corroborates his
information with additional facts, he must be responsible for detailing those additional facts which do not point toward the reliability
and credibility of his informant. A "totality of circumstances" ap22 7
proach can demand nothing less.
Closely related to the "totality of circumstances" requirement
as it bears upon police is the need to develop measures to limit magistrate shopping by police officers. 22 8 Because facts in criminal cases
are often developed over time, with additional facts coming to the
fore, a finding of "no probable cause" by a magistrate should not be
seen as resjudicata as to future warrant applications in the same case
for the same location. However, if reliance upon the judicial opinion to issue a warrant is to be given the same status as a judicial
opinion in the mistake of law context, the ability to approach different magistrates until one of the magistrates "gets it right" must be
curtailed. Once a determination is made that there exists no probable cause to search, additional judicial resources should not be
used unless additional information is gained. A true "totality of circumstances" test should require that once a magistrate has made a
"practical, common sense determination" that under the facts
before him no probable cause to search exists, the existence of this
determination must be relayed to subsequent magistrates who are
asked to rule on the existence of probable cause. 22 9
3.

Reviewability of Magistrates' Decisions

It may well be that our legal system does not know whether it is
willing to accept unreviewable decisions made by non-law-trained
persons on questions of search and seizure. This seems to be part
of the message delivered by Justice Blackmun in his concurring
opinion in Leon:
If it should emerge from experience that, contrary to our expectations, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule results in a
material change in police compliance with the Fourth Amendment, we
shall have to reconsider what we have undertaken here. The logic of a
decision that rests on untested predictions about police conduct de227 This reading of Gates conflicts with what Justice Brennan fears will result due to
Leon. 468 U.S. at 957 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
228 See L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 120 (1965).
See also W. LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 1.3, at 39-41 (1978). There is very little empirical
data on the scope of this problem. McCoy, supra note 155, at 62.
22) See Bradley, supra note 15, at 297.
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mands no less. 230
The great difficulty of Justice Blackmun's proposal lies in knowing
whether the good faith exception in particular, and the role of the
non-law-trained magistrate in general, have resulted in a "material
change in police compliance with the Fourth Amendment." 23 1 As
noted by Justice Brennan in dissent, it is very difficult to argue for
changes in fourth amendment law on the basis of social science research conducted in the area. 23 2 One may hope otherwise, but Justice Blackmun's appeal for experimentation and documentation
probably just delays the choices one must make regarding the qualifications required for issuing magistrates and the impact of unreviewability upon fourth amendment safeguards. It may be that
Justice Blackmun's concurrence is merely his way station on the
road to further limitation or abandonment of the exclusionary rule.
If it is determined, however, that our legal system is currently
not willing to accept unreviewable fourth amendment decisions by
non-law-trained persons (or after a few years experience with Leon it
is determined that our legal system no longer is willing to tolerate
unreviewable probable cause determinations), Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Leon presents a way to reduce drastically the unreviewability of magistrate decisions. Gates, he observes, held that
"[t]he task of an issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical,
common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit before him. ... There is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place." 23 3 After noting that the majority would not apply its good
faith exception to a warrant based on an affidavit "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable," Justice Brennan concludes that the good faith
exception in Leon is rather meaningless:
The task of a reviewing court is confined to determining whether
the magistrate had a "substantial basis" for concluding that probable
cause existed. Given such a relaxed standard, it is virtually inconceivable that a reviewing court, when faced with a defendant's motion to
suppress, could first find that a warrant was invalid under the new Gates
standard, but at the same time, find that a police officer's reliance on
such an invalid warrant was nevertheless "objectively reasonable"
under the test announced today. Because the two standards overlap
so completely, it is unlikely that a warrant could be found invalid
under Gates and yet the police reliance upon it could be seen as objec230
231
232
233

Leon, 468 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Id. at 942 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 958 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tively reasonable; otherwise, we would have to entertain the mind boggling concept of objectively
reasonable reliance upon an objectively
23 4
unreasonable warrant.

In other words, the issue of the informed magistrate may be
met by the same method of appellate review that existed after Gates

but before Leon. Leon adds nothing to Gates, and Leon retains appel-

23 5
late review of those cases which do not meet the Gates standard.

Whether Justice Brennan is correct in his assessment of Leon
must await the test of time, but a recognition of the problem of magistrate quality which Leon resurrects may convince future courts to
look favorably upon Justice Brennan's interpretation of Leon. Of
course, another method to enable reviewability of a magistrate's decision is for courts to read broadly the exceptions which the Leon
court created to its own rule.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Leon is a questionable decision because it assumes that police
officers need encouragement, beyond the constitutional require-

ments of the fourth amendment, to seek a judicial opinion (a search
warrant) that a search is proper. However, assuming that Leon is
likely to remain the opinion of the Supreme Court, and assuming
that Leon is not a mere way station on the road to total obliteration
of the exclusionary rule, Leon must be limited to judicially-warranted
searches. Just as the mistake of law doctrine serves as a defense only
in those situations in which an actor has sought information from a

specific source, the Leon good faith exception should apply only
when permission to search has been received from the court. In
terms of a deterrence analysis, the Leon exception should not be ex-

panded in reliance upon specific deterrence of the individual officer.
234 Id. at 958-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
235 See W. LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 30-33; Alschuler, supra note 51, at 322-24; Bradley,
supra note 15, at 290-91; LaFave, supra note 10, at 923-26; Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra
note 10, at 95-97. The Idaho Court of Appeals commented that Leon
provides such an exception [to the exclusionary rule] when the affidavit or sworn
testimony is "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its
existence entirely unreasonable." We confess that we are unsure how this quantum
of evidence compares to the level needed to support a probable cause determination under Gates. It splits a fine hair indeed to say that the evidence is so deficient
there is no "substantial basis" to find probable cause under the "totality of circumstances," but that evidence is still not "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to
render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." For the vast majority of
situations, it would appear that the Supreme Court in Gates and Leon has killed one
bird with two stones.
State v. Schaffer, 107 Idaho 812, 822, 693 P.2d 458, 468 (1984). See Stringer v. State,
491 So. 2d 837, 841 (Miss. 1986)(Robertson, J., concurring); see also W. LAFAvE, supra
note 2, at 15.
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The officer who attempts to justify a search on the grounds of permission, other than a search warrant, should not be justified any
more than the individual should be excused from criminal liability
for his conduct if he has sought guidance from unofficial sources.
The criminal law is comfortable with its general deterrence model
for the mistake of law defense as modified by an exception which
encourages the individual to seek official guidance from a limited
number of sources. In the Leon situation, the community should feel
equally comfortable in relying upon a general theory of deterrence
for the exclusionary rule since the remedy of the exclusion of evidence is a remedy directed against the population as a whole as represented by the prosecuting arm of the state. The exclusionary rule
should not be concerned with the culpability of the individual police
officer.

